Pugh v. Ring : Reply Brief by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1986
Pugh v. Ring : Reply Brief
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Robert J. Shaugnessy; Suzan Pixton; Ralph Finlayson; James. R. Black; Black & Moore; attorneys for
defendants.
Phillip B. Shell; attorney for applicant.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Mark Pugh v. Bruce Ring, No. 860357.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1986).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/1242
JTAH 
DOCUMLuf 
< F U 
50 
A10 
DGCK€T-NO-.-~ o3S? 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE) OF UTAH 
MARK PUGH, 
Applicant/Respondent, 
vs • 
BRUCE RING (Uninsured), 
Defendant/Respondent, 
DENNIS JACOBSEN and/or STATE 
INSURANCE FUND, 
Defendants/Appellants, 
DEFAULT INDEMNITY FUND, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
Industrial Commission 
Case No, 85000966 
Supreme Court No. 860357 
Priority No. 6 
REPLY BRIEF 
James R. 
BLACK & MOORE 
Robert J. Shaugnessy 
543 East 500 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
261 East 
Salt Lakel 
Attd 
Appq 
Black 
Broadway, Suite 300 
City, Utah 84111 
rney for Defendants/ 
Hants 
84111 
Attorney for Respondent, Bruce Ring 
Suzan Pixton 
Administrator, Default 
Indemnity Fund 
P.O. Box 45580 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0580 
Ralph Finlayson 
236 Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorney for the Industrial 
Commission of Utah 
Phillip B. Shell 
Attorney at Law 
45 East Vine Street 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Attorney for Respondent, Mark Pugh 
FILED 
JAN 51987 
Clerk, Supreme Court, Utah 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MARK PUGH, 
Applicant/Respondent, 
vs • 
BRUCE RING (Uninsured), 
Defendant/Respondent, 
DENNIS JACOBSEN and/or STATE 
INSURANCE FUND, 
Defendants/Appellants, 
DEFAULT INDEMNITY FUND, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
Industrial Commission 
Case No. 85000966 
Supreme Court No. 860357 
Priority No. 6 
REPLY BRIEF 
Robert J. Shaugnessy 
543 East 500 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Respondent, Bruce Ring 
Suzan Pixton 
Administrator, Default 
Indemnity Fund 
P.O. Box 45580 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0580 
Ralph Finlayson 
236 Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorney for the Industrial 
Commission of Utah 
Phillip B. Shell 
Attorney at Law 
45 East Vine Street 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Attorney for Respondent, Mark Pugh 
James R. Black 
BLACK & MOORE 
261 East Broadway, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Defendants/ 
Appellants 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: APPLYING THE PRINCIPLES AS SET FORTH 
IN UTAH CASE LAW, DENNIS JACOBSEN, 
AS GENERAL CONTRACTOR, DID NOT 
RETAIN THE REQUISITE ACTUAL SUPER-
VISION OR CONTROL OVER THE WORK OF 
BRUCE RING SO AS TO INVOKE A 
STATUTORY EMPLOYER/EMPLOYEE RELA-
TIONSHIP AS BETWEEN JACOBSEN AND 
RING, NOR BETWEEN JACOBSEN AND 
MARK PUGH ; 
POINT II: 
THE UNINSURED EMPLOYERS FUND STEPS 
INTO THE SHOES OF A DEFAULTING EMPLOYER 
AND INCURS LIABILITY FOR COMPENSATION 
BENEFITS PRIOR TO A STATUTORY EMPLOYER'S 
LIABILITY ARISING 4 
CONCLUSION 
1 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page 
Bennett v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 
762 P.2d 427, 429 (Utah 1986) 2,3,4,5,6,7,8,10 
Graham v. R. Thorne Foundation, 
675 P.2d 1196 (Utah 1984) 2 
Harry L> Young and Sons v, Ashton, 
538 P.2d 316 (Utah 1975) 5 
Nochta v. Industrial Commission, 
7 Ariz. App. 166, 436 P.2d 944 (1968) 4 
Parkinson v. Industrial Commission, 
110 Utah 309, 172 P.2d 136 (Utah 1946) 5,6,7 
OTHER AUTHORITIES CITED 
Page 
Larson, Workmens Compensation Law, 
Section 49.11 at 9.2 8 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-42. . . . . . . 1,2,3,4 
ii 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MARK PUGH, 
Applicant/Respondent, 
vs. 
BRUCE RING (Uninsured), 
Defendant/Respondent, 
DENNIS JACOBSEN and/or STATE 
INSURANCE FUND, 
Defendants/Appellants, 
DEFAULT INDEMNITY FUND, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
REPLY BRIEF 
Industrial Commission 
Case No. 85000966 
Supreme Court No. 860357 
Priority No. 6 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPLYING THE PRINCIPLES AS SET FORTH IN UTAH 
CASE LAW, DENNIS JACOBSEN, AS GENERAL 
CONTRACTOR, DID NOT RETAIN THE REQUISITE 
ACTUAL SUPERVISION OR CONTROL OVER THE WORK OF 
BRUCE RING SO AS TO INVOKE A STATUTORY 
EMPLOYER/EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP AS BETWEEN 
JACOBSEN AND RING, NOR BETWEEN JACOBSEN AND 
MARK PUGH. 
As stated in appellants' brief in chief, in order to discern 
whether or not Mark Pugh was a statutory employee of Dennis 
Jacobsen, it is necessary to examine the relationship between 
Jacobsen and Bruce Ring. That is, in accordance with Sect. 35-1-42 
U.C.A., Dennis Jacobsen may be deemed a statutory employer of Pugh 
(an employee of Bruce Ring) if Jacobsen retained the requisite 
supervision or control over the work of Bruce Ring. It is 
appellant's contention that Jacobsen lacked the requisite control 
or supervision which would make him a statutory employer. 
In determining whether or not the requisite supervision or control 
was present, it is necessary to look at the totality of the 
facts. And whether a worker is an employee within the meaning of 
the workmen's compensation laws requires the application of a 
statutory standard to the facts, Bennett v. Industrial Commission 
of Utah, 762 P.2d 427, 429 (Utah 1986). Thus, in determining the 
relationships existing among the various parties in the case at 
bar, it is necessary to apply the standards of Sect. 35-1-42 
U.C.A. to the pertinent facts. 
Inasmuch as appellants' brief in chief cites many Utah cases 
which have examined the standards of Sect. 35-1-42, it is not 
necessary to thoroughly re-examine those cases here. Suffice it 
to say that the cases cited in appellants' brief in chief stand 
for the proposition that in order for one to be deemed a statutory 
employer, he must have retained the right to control or supervise 
the execution of the work for which he has contracted. While 
appellants believe that the facts in the case at bar are such that 
the standards enunciated in appellants cited cases require a 
finding of no statutory employer/employee relationship, 
respondents contend that the cases cited in appellants' brief in 
chief are "irrelevant in light of Bennett". (Respondents' brief, 
page 7.) Appellants take exception to this contention. Bennett 
did not overrule Graham v. R. Thorne Foundation, 675 P.2d 1196 
(Utah 1984), nor any of the other cases cited by Jacobsen/State 
Insurance Fund. 
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Further, a close reading of Bennett and the authorities cited 
therein reveals that Bennett does not necessitate a finding that a 
statutory employer/employee relationship exists in the present 
controversy. 
Respondents5 claim, "[T]he Jacobsen/Ring relationship clearly 
meets the supervision or control standard enunciated in Bennett," 
(Respondent brief, page 7). It should be noted that Bennett did 
not actually decide an issue with which we are concerned. 
(Bennett decided the issue concerning a relationship between a sub 
contractor and his "employee"; The Court did, however, analyze 
Sect. 35-1-42 (2) and set forth principles to be used in deter-
mining the relationship between a general contractor and a subcon-
tractor's employee). However, even applying the principles and 
standards which the Bennett Court discussed regarding a general 
contractor - subcontractor relationship, the Jacobsen/Ring 
relationship does not meet the supervision or control standard set 
forth. That is, Jacobsen failed to retain the necessary super-
vision or control over the work of Ring so as to bring about a 
statutory employer/employee relationship. 
Respondent relies upon and emphasizes a portion of the 
Bennett decision which states, "[T]he term 'supervision or 
control' requires only that the general contractor retain ultimate 
control over the project." 726 P.2d at 432. Thus the question 
becomes: How much control must the general contractor retain so 
that it can be said that he retained ultimate control over the 
project? 
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Although the Bennett Court never expressly answered this 
question, it appears that the "control" contemplated is a reten-
tion of control over more than merely the ends to be attained. 
That is, ultimate control embodies a retention of control over the 
means used to attain the desired end result. This inference can 
be gleaned through an examination of the authority cited by the 
Bennett Court. 
Immediately after stating, "• . . 'supervision or control' 
requires only that the general contractor retain ultimate control 
over the project," 726 P.2d at 432, the Bennett Court cites with 
approval a portion of the opinion in Nochta v. Industrial Commis-
sion, 7 Ariz. App. 166, 436 P.2d 944 (1968). Although the cited 
portion of the Nochta opinion speaks in generalities, the Arizona 
Court did hold that in order for one to be deemed a statutory 
employer, the alleged employer must retain control over the method 
of reaching the required result. The Bennett Court cited three 
different Arizona cases in its decision, and while appellants in 
no way suggest that Arizona case law is determinative of this 
issue, the frequency with which Arizona cases are cited indicates 
this Courts readiness to accept the standards enunciated by those 
Courts. It should be noted that Arizona's counterpart to 
Sect. 35-1-42, U.C.A. contains language almost identical to that 
contained in the Utah statute. 
The Bennett Court also cited a Utah case which enumerated 
specific factors to look at in determining the right to control. 
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The Court cited Harry L. Young and Sons v. Ashton, 538 P.2d 316 
(Utah 1975) with approval: 
Many factors have beeii applied in deteriftiivi^ g 
the right to control. Among those factors are 
actual supervision, the method of payment, the 
furnishing of equipment for the worker, and 
the right to terminate the worker. . • . Al-
though these factors are not inclusive, they 
are relevant in many cases, including this 
case. 
726 P.2d at 430. 
Although the above quoted portion of the opinion was made 
while discussing the relationship existing between a subcontractor 
and his 'employee', the same standards and principles are appli-
cable in determining the relationship between a contractor and a 
'subcontractor'. This is so because the focus of inquiry in both 
situations revolves around how much 'control or supervision* one 
person retains over another. It is this retention of control (or 
lack thereof) which defines the relationship. 
Applying these various factors to the case at bar, it is 
readily apparent that Jacobsen did not retain the requisite 
I 
supervision or control which would make him a statutory employer. 
Inasmuch as appellants' brief in chief discusses the application 
of the various factors to the case at bar, it is unnecessary to 
reiterate that application here. 
Respondent also refers to a portion of the Bjennett decision 
which refers to Parkinson v. Industrial Commission, 110 Utah 309, 
172 P.2d 136 (Utah 1946). Citing Parkinson, the Rennet t Court 
stated: 
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Therefore, as long as a subcontractor's work 
is a part or process of the general con-
tractor's business, an inference arises that 
the general contractor has retained super-
vision or control over the subcontractor 
sufficient to meet the requirement of 
Sect. 35-1-42(2). 
While the Bennett Court, in referring to Parkinson, stated 
that an inference of the requisite control may arise, a close 
reading of Parkinson indicates that the inference arising is in no 
way set in concrete. That is, even if an inference arises, it may 
easily be refuted. What the Parkinson Court actually said, was: 
If the work to be done is a part or process of 
the employer's business, it is more probable 
that the employer would closely supervise that 
part or process and therefore more probable 
that he has the right to control how the 
workman does his job. Likewise, the prob-
ability of the employer directing the work-
man's activities are much greater where there 
is no definite job or piece of work contracted 
for than when he agrees to do a specific job 
and especially when such specific job is the 
type of work he does in his independent 
calling. 
172 P.2d at 140. 
Thus, while perhaps it is more probable that when a piece of 
work is a part or process of the employer's business, he will 
retain the power to control the 'employee', an examination of the 
totality of the facts is necessary. It should be noted that the 
Parkinson case is over 40 years old and that the probability 
spoken of is not as probable today as 40 years ago. This is so 
because trades have become more specialized in the past 40 years* 
That is, today a contractor who subcontracts some of his work to a 
person specialized in a field is less likely to retain the 
requisite supervision or control because the subcontractor is 
probably more highly qualified and experienced than the con-
tractor . 
It should also be noted that the Parkinson Court made the 
following statement: 
It is when the employer can not only determine 
where the work shall be done but how it should 
be executed that the relationship is that of 
employer-employee. 
172 P.2d at 140. 
Accordingly, this supports the appellants' contention that 
the requisite retention of supervision and control contemplates 
not merely control over the end result, but rather a right to 
control the means to be used in attaining that end, or the right 
to determine how the work should be executed. 
The only case which respondents cite in support of their 
contention that Jacobsen was a statutory employer, is Bennett. 
Respondents state that the cases cited in appellants' brief in 
chief are irrelevant in light of Bennett. This is an erroneous 
assumption. First of all, Bennett did not over-rule any of the 
cases cited by appellant. Second, respondents are in error in 
contending that the Jacobsen/Ring relationship meets the super-
vision or control standard enunciated in Bennett. Bennett did not 
expressly set forth a supervision or control standard. Rather, 
the Court stated that the supervision or control standard should 
be determined in light of the principles discussed. Inasmuch as 
Bennett did not discuss with any definiteness the principles to 
which it referred, it is necessary to delve further into the 
7 
authorities cited by Bennett. All of the aforementioned author-
ities cited in Bennett indicate that for one to be a statutory 
employer, he must retain the right to control or supervise the 
method used to attain the end result. Clearly, Jacobsen did not 
retain this control and therefore he is not a statutory employer. 
In sum, while Bennett stands for the proposition that one 
must retain ultimate control over the project to be classified a 
statutory employer, "ultimate control," in light of the author-
ities cited, contemplates the right to control the means used in 
reaching the desired end. 
POINT II 
THE UNINSURED EMPLOYERS' FUND STEPS INTO THE 
SHOES OF A DEFAULTING EMPLOYER AND INCURS 
LIABILITY FOR COMPENSATION BENEFITS PRIOR TO A 
STATUTORY EMPLOYER'S LIABILITY ARISING. 
It is appellants' contention that the Uninsured Employers' 
Fund was created for the purpose of paying and assuring the 
payment of benefits to employees of insolvent employers. Further, 
appellants contend that the liability of the Uninsured Employers' 
Fund will come into play prior to that of a statutory employer. 
In Larson, Workmens Compensation Law, Section 49.11 at 9.2, 
Professor Larson notes that the usual liability of a statu-
tory employer is "secondary." In accordance with this, appellants 
maintain that because they are only secondarily liable, (if in 
fact they are statutory employers) Jacobsen/Sbate Insurance Fund 
cannot incur liability until all primary liability has been 
exhausted. That is, Bruce Ring as Pugh's immediate employer, 
incurs primary liability. If Ring is insolvent, then the Unin-
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sured Employers' Fund steps into the shoes of Ring, and acts as a 
surety. If the Uninsured Employers' Fund does not have adequate 
funding to pay the awarded benefits, then the statutory employer 
becomes responsible for the benefits, as its liability is second-
ary to that of Bruce Ring and the Fund. 
In respondents' brief, it is argued that if the Fund steps 
in as the surety for a defaulting employer, then a statutory 
employer escapes liability altogether. Respondents cite a portion 
of the Industrial Commission's finding wherein it stated: 
If the Legislature had jwanted the 
[Uninsured Employers Fund] to take the place 
of 'statutory' employers, the legislature 
would have repealed the statutory employers' 
section of U.C.A. 35-1-42, when the [Uninsured 
Employers Fund] legislation was passed. As 
the legislature did not do so, the Commission 
finds the [Uninsured Employers Fund] was not 
intended to replace statutory employers. 
(R. 169). 
The contention made by respondent and the above statement of 
the Industrial Commission are not correct. 
The Uninsured Employers' Fund incurring liability prior to a 
statutory employer is not tantamount to relieving the statutory 
employer of liability altogether. Rather, if the Fund lacks the 
necessary funds to pay the benefits due, then the statutory 
employer's secondary liability comes into play. This is in 
accordance with the purpose of broadening the base of liability so 
as to provide adequate compensation to the injured worker. That 
is, statutory employer liability is not abandoned altogether. 
Rather, the liability merely surfaces after the exhaustion of 
those who are primarily liable. Thus, a general contractor will 
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still be concerned with hiring responsible subcontractors who 
will procure the appropriate compensation protection for their 
workers. This is so because a statutory employer will be well 
aware of the fact that if the Uninsured Employers5 Fund becomes 
depleted of its funds, it is the statutory employer who becomes 
ultimately liable. 
Respondents also contend that if the legislature had intended 
for the Uninsured Employers Fund to incur liability prior to a 
statutory employer, then the legislature would have provided more 
adequate funding and reserves. That there is inadequate funding 
of the Uninsured Employers Fund is mere speculation. Tt is 
appellants* belief that the legislature took into consideration 
the Uninsured Employers' Fund's potential liability prior to 
determining how the Fund was to be funded. Further, one cannot 
assume that the legislature did not consider the back-up position 
of statutory employers when it considered the fiscal stability of 
the Fund. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellants contend that based upon the authorities cited in 
appellants' brief iji chief, as well as the standards enunciated in 
Bennett, Dennis Jacobsen did not retain the ultimate power or 
supervision over the work of Bruce Ring so as to invoke a statu-
tory employer-employee relationship. The requisite retention of 
supervision and control contemplates the right to control the 
method used in attaining the desired result. 
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Further, even if Jacobsen is deemed to be a statutory 
employer, his liability is secondary and comes into play only if 
the Uninsured Employers' Fund is insolvent. 
DATED this _^_ day of January, 1987. 
BLACK & MOORE 
<#o puM). 
JAMES R. BLACK 
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